Adversarial Detection and Correction by Matching Prediction
  Distributions by Vacanti, Giovanni & Van Looveren, Arnaud
Adversarial Detection and Correction by Matching Prediction Distributions
Giovanni Vacanti * 1 Arnaud Van Looveren * 1
Abstract
We present a novel adversarial detection and cor-
rection method for machine learning classifiers.
The detector consists of an autoencoder trained
with a custom loss function based on the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between the classifier predic-
tions on the original and reconstructed instances.
The method is unsupervised, easy to train and
does not require any knowledge about the un-
derlying attack. The detector almost completely
neutralises powerful attacks like Carlini-Wagner
or SLIDE on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, and
remains very effective on CIFAR-10 when the
attack is granted full access to the classification
model but not the defence. We show that our
method is still able to detect the adversarial exam-
ples in the case of a white-box attack where the
attacker has full knowledge of both the model and
the defence and investigate the robustness of the
attack. The method is very flexible and can also
be used to detect common data corruptions and
perturbations which negatively impact the model
performance. We illustrate this capability on the
CIFAR-10-C dataset.†
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) are instances
which are carefully crafted by applying small perturbations
to the original data with the goal to trick the machine learn-
ing classifier and change the predicted class. As a result,
the classification model makes erroneous predictions which
poses severe security issues for the deployment of machine
learning systems in the real world. Achieving an acceptable
level of security against adversarial attacks is a milestone
that must be reached in order to trust and act on the predic-
tions of safety-critical machine learning systems at scale.
The issue regards many emerging technologies in which the
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use of machine learning models is prominent. For example,
an attacker could craft adversarial images in order to induce
an autonomous driving system to interpret a STOP sign as
a RIGHT OF WAY sign and compromise the safety of the
autonomous vehicle.
Given the crucial importance of the subject, a number of
proposals claiming valid defence methods against adversar-
ial attacks have been put forth in recent years (see Section 2
for more details). Some of these proposals have obtained
promising results on basic benchmark datasets for grey-box
attacks, i.e. attacks where the attacker has full knowledge
of the model but not of the defence system. However, even
in the grey-box scenario most of these approaches usually
fail to generalise to more complex datasets or they are im-
practical. Moreover, effective and practical defences against
white-box attacks, i.e. attacks where the attacker has full
knowledge of the model and the defence mechanism, are
still out of reach.
We argue that autoencoders trained with loss functions based
on a distance metric between the input data and the recon-
structed instances by the autoencoder network are flawed for
the task of adversarial detection since they do not take the
goal of the attacker into account. The attack applies near im-
perceptible perturbations to the input which change the class
predicted by the classifier. Since the impact of the attack
is most prominent in the model output space, this is where
the defence should focus on during training. We propose a
novel method for adversarial detection and correction based
on an autoencoder network with a model dependent loss
function designed to match the prediction probability dis-
tributions of the original and reconstructed instances. The
output of the autoencoder can be seen as a symmetric exam-
ple since it is crafted to mimic the prediction distribution
produced by the classifier on the original instance and does
not contain the adversarial artefact anymore. We also define
an adversarial score based on the mismatch between the
prediction distributions of the classifier on an instance and
its symmetric counterpart. This score is highly effective to
detect both grey-box and white-box attacks. The defence
mechanism is trained in an unsupervised fashion and does
not require any knowledge about the underlying attack. Be-
cause the method is designed to extract knowledge from
the classifier’s output probability distribution, it bears some
resemblance to defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016).
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
09
36
4v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
1 F
eb
 20
20
Adversarial Detection and Correction by Matching Prediction Distributions
Besides detecting malicious adversarial attacks, the adver-
sarial score also proves to be an effective measure for more
common data corruptions and perturbations which degrade
the machine learning model’s performance. Our method is
in principle applicable to any machine learning classifier
vulnerable to adversarial attacks, regardless of the modality
of the data.
In the following, Section 2 gives a brief summary of cur-
rent developments in the field of adversarial defence. In
Section 3 we describe our method in more detail while Sec-
tion 4 discusses the results of our experiments. We validate
our method against a variety of state-of-the-art grey-box
and white-box attacks on the MNIST (LeCun & Cortes,
2010), Fashion-MNIST (Xiao et al., 2017) and CIFAR-10
(Krizhevsky, 2009) datasets. We also evaluate our method as
a data drift detector on the CIFAR-10-C dataset (Hendrycks
& Dietterich, 2019).
2. Related Work
2.1. Adversarial attacks
Since the discovery of adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2013), a variety of methods have been proposed to generate
such instances via adversarial attacks. The aim of the attack
is to craft an instance xadv that changes the predicted class
c of the machine learning classifier M without noticeably
altering the original instance x. In other words, the attack
tries to find the smallest perturbation δ such that the model
predicts different classes for x and x+ δ.
If the attack is targeted, the classifier prediction on x + δ
is restricted to a predetermined class c. For an untargeted
attack, any class apart from the one predicted on x is suffi-
cient for the attack to be successful. From here on we only
consider untargeted attacks as they are less constricted and
easier to succeed. Formally, the attack tries to solve the
following optimisation problem:
min
δ
||δ||p s.t. C(x) 6= C(x+ δ) (1)
where || · ||p is the `p norm, C(·) = argmaxM(·) and M(·)
represents the prediction probability vector of the classifier.
We validate our adversarial defence on three different at-
tacks: Carlini-Wagner (Carlini & Wagner, 2016), SLIDE
(Tramr & Boneh, 2019) and the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2015b). The Carlini-Wagner
(C&W) and SLIDE attacks are very powerful and able to
reduce the accuracy of machine learning classifiers on pop-
ular datasets such as CIFAR-10 to nearly 0% while keeping
the adversarial instances visually indistinguishable from the
original ones. FGSM on the other hand is a fast but less pow-
erful attack, resulting in more obvious adversarial instances.
Although many other attack methods like EAD (Chen et al.,
2018), DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) or Itera-
tive FGSM (Kurakin et al., 2017) exist, the scope covered
by C&W, SLIDE and FGSM is sufficient to validate our
defence.
Carlini-Wagner We use the `2 version of the C&W at-
tack. The `2-C&W attack approximates the minimisation
problem given in Equation (1) as
min
δ
||δ||2 + c · f(x+ δ) s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n (2)
where f(x + δ) is a custom loss designed to be negative
if and only if the class predicted by the model for x + δ
is equal to the target class and where || · ||2 denotes the `2
norm.
SLIDE The SLIDE attack is an iterative attack based
on the `1 norm. Given the loss function of the classifier
L(θ, x, y), at each iteration the gradients g with respect to
the input are calculated. The unit vector e determines the
direction of the perturbation δ and the components of e are
updated according to
ei = sign(gi) if |gi| > Pq(|g|) else 0 (3)
where Pq(|g|) represent the q-th percentile of the gradients’
components. The perturbation δ is then updated as δ ←
δ + λ · e/||e||2 where λ is the step size of the attack.
FGSM The Fast Gradient Sign Method is designed to
craft a perturbation δ in the direction of the gradients of the
model’s loss function with respect to the input x according
to
x+ δ = x+  · sign(~∇xL(θ, x, y)), (4)
where  is a small parameter fixing the size of the perturba-
tion and L(θ, x, y) is the loss function of the classifier.
2.2. Adversarial Defences
Different defence mechanisms have been developed to deal
with the negative impact of adversarial attacks on the classi-
fier’s performance. Adversarial training augments the train-
ing data with adversarial instances to increase the model
robustness (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015a).
Adversarial training tailored to a specific attack type can
however leave the model vulnerable to other perturbation
types (Tramr & Boneh, 2019).
A second approach attempts to remove the adversarial arte-
facts from the example and feed the purified instance to the
machine learning classifier. Defense-GAN (P. Samangouei,
2018) uses a Wasserstein GAN (Arjovsky et al., 2017) which
is trained on the original data. The difference between the
GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014) generator output G(z) and
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the adversarial instance xadv is minimised with respect to
z. The generated instance G(z∗) is then fed to the classifier.
Defense-GAN comes with a few drawbacks. GAN train-
ing can be notoriously unstable and suffer from issues like
mode collapse which would reduce the effectiveness of the
defence. The method also needs to apply L gradient descent
optimisation steps with R random restarts at inference time,
making it computationally more expensive. MagNet (Meng
& Chen, 2017) uses one or more autoencoder-based detec-
tors and reformers to respectively flag adversarial instances
and transform the input data before feeding it to the classi-
fier. The autoencoders are trained with the mean squared
error (MSE) reconstruction loss, which is suboptimal for ad-
versarial detection as it focuses on reconstructing the input
without taking the decision boundaries into account. Other
defences using autoencoders either require knowledge about
the attacks like (Li et al., 2019; Li & Ji, 2018) or class labels
(Hwang et al., 2019). PixelDefend (Song et al., 2018) uses
a generative model to purify the adversarial instance.
A third approach, defensive distillation (Papernot et al.,
2016), utilises model distillation (Hinton et al., 2015) as
a defence mechanism. A second classification model is
trained by minimising the cross entropy between the class
probabilities of the original classifier and the predictions of
the distilled model. Defensive distillation reduces the im-
pact of gradients used in crafting adversarial instances and
increases the number of features that need to be changed.
Although our method uses an autoencoder to mitigate the
adversarial attack, it can also relate to defensive distillation
since we optimise for the K-L divergence between the model
predictions on the original and reconstructed instances.
3. Method
3.1. Threat Model
The threat model describes the capabilities and knowledge
of the attacker. These assumptions are crucial to evaluate
the defence mechanism and allow like-for-like comparisons.
The attack is only allowed to change the input features x by
a small perturbation δ such that the predicted class C(x+ δ)
is different from C(x). Since we assume that the attack
is untargeted, C(x + δ) is not restricted to a predefined
class c. The attack is however not allowed to modify the
weights or architecture of the machine learning model. A
most important part of the threat model is the knowledge
of the attack about both the model and the defence. We
consider three main categories:
Black-box attacks This includes all attack types where
the attacker only has access to the input and output of the
classifier under attack. The output can either be the pre-
dicted class or the output probability distribution over all
CIFAR10 Image
frog: 0.003
Adversarial
cat: 2.902
Autoencoder Reconstruction
frog
ship: 0.009 automobile: 2.526 ship
automobile: 0.042 cat: 3.882 automobile
Figure 1. Adversarial detection and correction examples on
CIFAR-10 after a C&W attack. The first two columns show re-
spectively the original and adversarial instances with the class
predictions and adversarial scores. The last column visualises the
reconstructed instance of the adversarial image by the autoencoder
with the corrected prediction.
the classes.
Grey-box attacks The attacker has full knowledge about
the classification model but not the defence mechanism.
This includes information about the model’s architecture,
weights, loss function and gradients.
White-box attacks On top of full knowledge about the
classifier, the attack also has complete access to the internals
of the defence mechanism. This includes the logic of the de-
fence, loss function as well as model weights and gradients
for a differentiable defence system. Security against white-
box attacks implies security against all the less powerful
grey-box and black-box attacks.
We validate the strength of our proposed defence mecha-
nism for a variety of grey-box and white-box attacks on the
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
3.2. Defence Mechanism
Our novel approach is based on an autoencoder network.
An autoencoder AE consists of an encoder which maps
vectors x in the input space Rn to vectors z in a latent
space Rd with d < n, and a decoder which maps z back
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to vectors x′ = AE(x) in Rn. The encoder and decoder
are jointly trained to approximate an input transformation
T : X → X , which is defined by the optimisation objective,
or loss function.
There have been multiple attempts to employ convention-
ally trained autoencoders for adversarial example detection
(Meng & Chen, 2017; Hwang et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019).
Usually, autoencoders are trained to find a transformation
T that reconstructs the input instance x as accurately as
possible with loss functions that are suited to capture the
similarities between x and x′ such as the reconstruction
error ||x − x′||22. However, these types of loss functions
suffer from a fundamental flaw for the task of adversarial
detection and correction. In essence, the attack tries to in-
troduce a minimal perturbation δ in the input space while
maximising the impact of δ on the model output space to
ensure C(x) 6= C(x + δ). If the autoencoder AEMSEθ is
trained with a reconstruction error loss, x′ will lie very close
to x and will be sensitive to the same adversarial pertur-
bation δ crafted around x. There is no guarantee that the
transformation AEMSEθ (x+ δ) is able to remove the adver-
sarial perturbation from the input since the autoencoder’s
objective is only to reconstruct x+ δ as truthful as possible
in the input space.
The novelty of our proposal relies on the use of a model-
dependent loss function based on a distance metric in the
output space of the model to train the autoencoder network.
Given a model M we optimise the weights θ of an auto-
encoder AEθ using the following objective function:
min
θ
DKL(M(x)||M(AEKLθ (x))) (5)
where DKL(·||·) denotes the K-L divergence and M(·) rep-
resents the prediction probability vector of the classifier.
Training of the autoencoder is unsupervised since we only
need access to the model prediction probabilities and the
normal training instances. The classifier weights are frozen
during training. Note that the fundamental difference be-
tween our approach and other defence systems based on
autoencoders relies on the fact that the minimisation objec-
tive is suited to capture similarities between instances in the
output space of the model rather than in the input feature
space.
Without the presence of a reconstruction loss term like
||x − x′||22, x′ simply tries to make sure that the predic-
tion probabilities M(x′) and M(x) match without caring
about the proximity of x′ to x. As a result, x′ is allowed
to live in different areas of the input feature space than x
with different decision boundary shapes with respect to the
model M . The carefully crafted adversarial perturbation
δ which is effective around x does not transfer to the new
location of x′ in the feature space, and the attack is there-
fore neutralised. This effect is visualised by Figure 1. The
Model
(Frozen weights)
M
Autoencoder
AE kl loss
x
x'
Training
Sx
Detection:
Is x adversarial?
Sx >= t    yes
Sx < t    no
Yes
Use output M(x')
No
Use output M(x)
Figure 2. An input instance x is transformed into x′ by the autoen-
coder AE. The K-L divergence between the output distributions
M(x) and M(x′) is calculated and used as loss function for train-
ing AE and as the adversarial signal Sx at inference time. Based
on some appropriate threshold t, Sx is used to flag adversarial in-
stances. If an instance is flagged, the correct prediction is retrieved
through the transformed instance x′. Note that the model’s weights
are frozen during training.
adversarial instance is close to the original image x in the
pixel space but the reconstruction of the adversarial attack
by the autoencoder x′adv = AE
KL
θ (xadv) lives in a different
region of the input space than xadv and looks like noise at
first glance. x′adv does however not contain the adversarial
artefacts anymore and the model prediction C(x′adv) returns
the corrected class.
The adversarial instances can also be detected via the adver-
sarial score Sadv:
Sadv(x) = D(M(x)||M(AEKLθ (x))) (6)
where D(·||·) is again a distance metric like the K-L diver-
gence. Sadv will assume high values for adversarial exam-
ples given the probability distribution difference between
predictions on the adversarial and reconstructed instance,
making it a very effective measure for adversarial detection.
Both detection and correction mechanisms can be combined
in a simple yet effective adversarial defence system, illus-
trated in Figure 2. First the adversarial score Sadv(x) is
computed. If the score exceeds a predefined threshold t the
instance is flagged as an adversarial example xadv. Similar
to MagNet the threshold t can be set using only normal
data by limiting the false positive rate to a small fraction
FPR. The adversarial instance is fed to the autoencoder
which computes the transformation x′adv = AE
KL
θ (xadv).
The classifier M finally makes a prediction on x′adv. If the
adversarial score is below the threshold t, the model makes
a prediction on the original instance x.
The method is also well suited for drift detection, i.e. for
the detection of corrupted or perturbed instances that are
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not necessarily adversarial by nature but degrade the model
performance.
3.3. Method Extensions
The performance of the correction mechanism can be im-
proved by extending the training methodology to one of the
hidden layers. We extract a flattened feature map F from
the hidden layer, feed it into a linear layer and apply the
softmax function:
yψ(x) = softmax(WψF (x) + b). (7)
The autoencoder is then trained by optimising
min
θ,ψ
DKL(M(x)||M(AEKLθ (x))+
λDKL(yψ(x)||yψ(AEKLθ (x))).
(8)
During training of AEKLθ , the K-L divergence between the
model predictions on x and x′ is minimised. If the entropy
from the output of the model’s softmax layer is high, it
becomes harder for the autoencoder to learn clear decision
boundaries. In this case, it can be beneficial to sharpen
the model’s prediction probabilities through temperature
scaling:
M(x)T =
M(x)
1
T∑
jM(x)
1
T
j
. (9)
The loss to minimise becomes
DKL(M(x)T ||M(AEKLθ (x))). The temperature T
itself can be tuned on a validation set.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setup
The adversarial attack experiments are conducted on the
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. The au-
toencoder architecture is similar across the datasets and
consists of 3 convolutional layers in both the encoder and de-
coder. The MNIST and Fashion-MNIST classifiers are also
similar and reach test set accuracies of respectively 99.28%
and 93.62%. For CIFAR-10, we train both a stronger
ResNet-56 (He et al., 2016) model up to 93.15% accuracy
and a weaker model which achieves 80.24% accuracy on
the test set. More details about the exact architecture and
training procedure of the different models can be found in
the appendix.
The defence mechanism is tested against Carlini-Wagner
(C&W), SLIDE and FGSM attacks with varying perturba-
tion strength . The attack hyperparameters and examples
Label: 8, Prediction: 2
Label: 8, Prediction: 8
Label: 2, Prediction: 7
Label: 2, Prediction: 2
Label: 9, Prediction: 7
Label: 9, Prediction: 9
Figure 3. The reconstructed images by the adversarial autoencoder
in the bottom row correct classifier mistakes on MNIST.
of adversarial instances for each attack can be found in the
appendix. The attacks are generated using the open source
Foolbox library (Rauber et al., 2017).
We consider two settings under which the attacks take place:
grey-box and white-box. Grey-box attacks have full knowl-
edge of the classification model M but not the adversarial
defence. White-box attacks on the other hand assume full
knowledge of both the model and defence and can propagate
gradients through both. As a result, white-box attacks try to
fool C(AEKLθ (x)).
4.2. Grey-Box Attacks
Mitigating adversarial attacks on classification tasks con-
sists of two steps: detection and correction. Table 1 to
Table 4 highlight the consistently strong performance of
the correction mechanism across the different datasets for
various attack types. On MNIST, strong attacks like C&W
and SLIDE which reduce the model accuracy to almost 0%
are corrected by the detector and the attack is neutralised,
nearly recovering the original accuracy of 99.28%. It is
also remarkable that when we evaluate the accuracy of the
Table 1. Test set accuracy for the MNIST classifier on both the
original and adversarial instances with and without the defence.
AEMSE and AEKL are the defence mechanisms trained with re-
spectively the MSE and DKL loss functions.
Attack No Attack No Defence AEMSE AEKL
CW 0.9928 0.0058 0.9887 0.9928
SLIDE 0.9928 0.0001 0.9891 0.9923
FGSM,  = 0.1 0.9928 0.9109 0.9901 0.9928
FGSM,  = 0.2 0.9928 0.5009 0.9821 0.9895
FGSM,  = 0.3 0.9928 0.1711 0.9610 0.9819
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classifier predictions C(AEKLθ (x)) where x is the original
test set, the accuracy equals 99.44%, surpassing the perfor-
mance of C(x). Figure 3 shows a few examples of instances
x that are corrected by AEKLθ , as well as their reconstruc-
tion x′. The corrected instances are outliers in the pixel
space for which the autoencoder manages to capture the
decision boundary. The correction accuracy drops slightly
from 99.28% to 98.19% for FGSM attacks when increasing
the perturbation strength  from 0.1 to 0.3. Higher values of
 lead to noisier adversarial instances which are easy to spot
with the naked eye and result in higher adversarial scores.
The results on Fashion-MNIST follow the same narrative.
The adversarial correction mechanism largely restores the
model accuracy after powerful attacks which can reduce the
accuracy without the defence up to 0%.
Table 2. Test set accuracy for the Fashion-MNIST classifier on
both the original and adversarial instances with and without the
defence. AEMSE and AEKL are the defence mechanisms trained
with respectively the MSE and DKL loss functions.
Attack No Attack No Defence AEMSE AEKL
CW 0.9362 0.1050 0.9173 0.9211
SLIDE 0.9362 0.0000 0.9211 0.9247
FGSM,  = 0.1 0.9362 0.1305 0.9132 0.9169
FGSM,  = 0.2 0.9362 0.0706 0.9078 0.9111
FGSM,  = 0.3 0.9362 0.0529 0.9007 0.9055
Table 3. CIFAR-10 test set accuracy for a simple CNN classifier
on both the original and adversarial instances with and without the
defence. AEMSE and AEKL are the defence mechanisms trained
with respectively the MSE and DKL loss functions. AEKL, T in-
cludes temperature scaling and AEKL, HL extends the methodology
to one of the hidden layers.
Attack No Attack No Defence AEMSE AEKL AEKL, T AEKL, HL
CW 0.8024 0.0001 0.6022 0.7551 0.7669 0.7688
SLIDE 0.8024 0.0208 0.6136 0.7704 0.7840 0.7864
FGSM,  = 0.1 0.8024 0.0035 0.5903 0.7554 0.7554 0.7628
FGSM,  = 0.2 0.8024 0.0035 0.5901 0.7555 0.7554 0.7624
FGSM,  = 0.3 0.8024 0.0036 0.5900 0.7552 0.7555 0.7621
Table 4. CIFAR-10 test set accuracy for a ResNet-56 classifier on
both the original and adversarial instances with and without the
defence. AEMSE and AEKL are the defence mechanisms trained
with respectively the MSE and DKL loss functions. AEKL, T in-
cludes temperature scaling and AEKL, HL extends the methodology
to one of the hidden layers.
Attack No Attack No Defence AEMSE AEKL AEKL, T AEKL, HL
CW 0.9315 0.0000 0.1650 0.8048 0.8141 0.8153
SLIDE 0.9315 0.0000 0.1659 0.8159 0.8265 0.8360
FGSM,  = 0.1 0.9315 0.0140 0.1615 0.7875 0.7882 0.7957
FGSM,  = 0.2 0.9315 0.0008 0.1615 0.7781 0.7760 0.7908
FGSM,  = 0.3 0.9315 0.0000 0.1615 0.7772 0.7752 0.7899
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Figure 4. Entropy of the classifier predictions on the test set for
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10.
The classification accuracy uplift on MNIST or Fashion-
MNIST from training the autoencoder with DKL instead of
the mean squared error between x and x′ is limited from
0.3% to 0.4% for adversarial instances generated by C&W
or SLIDE. Table 3 and Table 4 however show that the autoen-
coder defence mechanism trained with the K-L divergence
AEDKLθ outperforms the MSE equivalent AE
MSE
θ by respec-
tively over 15% and almost 65% on CIFAR-10 using the sim-
ple classifier and the ResNet-56 model. The performance
difference is even more pronounced when we simplify the
autoencoder architecture. An autoencoder with only one
hidden dense layer and ReLU activation function (Hahnloser
& Seung, 2000) in the encoder and one hidden dense layer
before the output layer in the decoder is still able to detect
and correct adversarial attacks on the CIFAR-10 ResNet-56
model when trained with DKL(M(x)||M(AEKLθ (x))). The
correction accuracy for C&W and SLIDE reaches 52.75%
and 52.83% compared to around 10%, or similar to random
predictions, if the same autoencoder is trained with the MSE
loss. The exact architecture can be found in the appendix.
The ROC curves for the adversarial scores Sadv and corre-
sponding AUC values in Figure 5 highlight the effective-
ness of the method for the different datasets. The AUC for
the strong C&W and SLIDE grey-box attacks are equal to
0.9992 for MNIST and approximately 0.984 for Fashion-
MNIST. For the ResNet-56 classifier on CIFAR-10, the
AUC is still robust at 0.9301 for C&W and 0.8880 on
SLIDE. As expected, increasing  for the FGSM attacks
results in slightly higher AUC values.
Figure 4 shows that the classifier’s entropy on CIFAR-10 is
higher than on MNIST or Fashion-MNIST. As a result, we
apply temperature scaling on M(x) during training of the
autoencoders AEKL,Tθ for the CIFAR-10 models. We find
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Figure 5. ROC curves and AUC values for adversarial instance detection on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 for C&W, SLIDE
and FGSM grey-box attacks. The curves and values are computed on the combined original and attacked test sets.
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Figure 6. ROC curves and AUC values for adversarial instance detection on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 for C&W, SLIDE
and FGSM white-box attacks. The curves and values are computed on the combined original and attacked test sets.
that the optimal value of T for the classifiers on CIFAR-10
equals 0.5 for the strong attacks. Table 3 and Table 4 show
that temperature scaling improves the classifier accuracy on
the adversarial instances generated by strong attacks like
C&W and SLIDE by an additional 0.93% to 1.36% for the
CIFAR-10 classifiers. Decreasing the temperature too much
leads to increasing overconfidence on potentially incorrect
predictions since the true labels are not used during training
of the autoencoder.
Table 3 and Table 4 also illustrate that including the hidden
layer divergence using Equation (8) for the CIFAR-10 clas-
sifiers leads to an accuracy improvement between 1% and
2% on the C&W and SLIDE attacks compared to our basic
defence mechanism. The feature maps are extracted after
the max-pooling layer for the simple CIFAR-10 model and
before the activation function in the last residual block of
the ResNet-56. As shown in the appendix, the improvement
is robust with respect to the choice of extracted hidden layer.
4.3. White-Box Attacks
In the case of white-box attacks, C&W and SLIDE are able
to reduce the accuracy of the predictions C(AEKLθ (xadv))
on all datasets to almost 0%. This does not mean that the
attack goes unnoticed or cannot be corrected in practice.
Moreover, while xadv manages to bypass the correction
mechanism it has a limited impact on the model accuracy
itself. For the ResNet-56 classifier on CIFAR-10, the predic-
tion accuracy of C(x) equals 93.15% on the original test set.
The accuracy of the model predictions on the adversarial
instances C(xadv) only drops to respectively 90.57% and
92.26% after C&W and SLIDE attacks.
Importantly, the adversarial attacks are not very transferable.
Assume that the autoencoder model under attack has been
trained for N epochs. Swapping it for the same model
but only trained for n < N epochs drastically reduces
the effectiveness of the attack and brings the classification
accuracy of C(AEKLθ (xadv)) back up from almost 0% to
respectively 67.59% and 73.87% for C&W and SLIDE. In
practice this means that we can cheaply boost the strength
of the defence by ensembling different checkpoints during
the training of AEKLθ . When the adversarial score Sadv(x)
is above a threshold value, the prediction on x is found by
applying a weighted majority vote over a combination of
the ensemble and the classifier:
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Figure 7. Mean adversarial scores with standard deviations (lhs)
and ResNet-56 accuracies (rhs) for increasing data corruption
severity levels on CIFAR-10-C. Level 0 corresponds to the original
CIFAR-10 test set. Harmful scores are scores from instances
which have been flipped from the correct to an incorrect prediction
because of the corruption. Not harmful means that the prediction
was unchanged after the corruption.
y = argmax
i
(
∑
j
wj1(hAE,j(x) = i)+
(1−
∑
j
wj)1(C(x) = i))
(10)
with
hAE,j = C(AE
DKL
θj
(x)). (11)
By combining autoencoders with different architectures we
can further improve the diversification and performance of
the ensemble. In order to guarantee the success of the white-
box attack, it needs to find a perturbation δ that fools the
weighted majority of the diverse defences and the classifier.
MagNet (Meng & Chen, 2017) also uses a collection of
autoencoders, but trained with the usual MSE loss.
The detector is still effective at flagging the adversarial
instances generated by the white-box attacks. This is evi-
denced in Figure 6 by the robust AUC values consistently
above 0.97 for MNIST on all attacks. The AUC for Fashion-
MNIST is equal to respectively 0.8544 and 0.8715 for C&W
and SLIDE and up to 0.9552 for FGSM. On CIFAR-10, the
AUC’s for C&W and SLIDE are 0.7673 and 0.7268, and
close to 0.85 for FGSM for different values of .
4.4. Data Drift Detection
It is important that safety-critical applications do not suffer
from common data corruptions and perturbations. Detection
of subtle input changes which reduce the model accuracy
is therefore crucial. Rabanser et al. (2019) discuss sev-
eral methods to identify distribution shift and highlight the
importance to quantify the harmfulness of the shift. The
adversarial detector proves to be very flexible and can be
used to measure the harmfulness of the data drift on the
classifier. We evaluate the detector on the CIFAR-10-C
dataset (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019). The instances in
CIFAR-10-C have been corrupted and perturbed by various
types of noise, blur, brightness etc. at different levels of
severity, leading to a gradual decline in model performance.
Figure 7 visualises the adversarial scores Sadv at different
levels of corruption severity for the ResNet-56 classifier on
CIFAR-10-C compared to CIFAR-10. The average scores
for the instances where the predicted class was changed
from the correct to an incorrect class due to the data cor-
ruption is between 2.91x and 5.87x higher than the scores
for the instances where the class predictions were not af-
fected by the perturbations. The average Sadv of the neg-
atively affected instances declines slightly with increas-
ing severity because the changes δ to x are stronger and
DKL(M(x + δ)||M(AEKLθ (x + δ))) is not as large. For
each level of corruption severity, a two-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two sample test (Smirnov, 1939) rejects the null
hypothesis that the negatively affected instances are drawn
from the same distribution as the samples unaffected by the
data corruption with a p-value of 0.0. As a result, the drift
detector provides a robust measure for the harmfulness of
the distribution shift.
5. Conclusions
We introduced a novel method for adversarial detection and
correction based on an autoencoder trained with a custom
loss function. The loss function aims to match the prediction
probability distributions between the original data and the
reconstructed instance by the autoencoder. We validate our
approach on a variety of grey-box and white-box attacks
on the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
The defence mechanism is very effective at detecting and
correcting strong grey-box attacks like Carlini-Wagner or
SLIDE and remains efficient for white-box attack detection.
Interestingly, the white-box attacks are not very transferable
between different autoencoders or even between the defence
mechanism and the standalone classification model. This is
a promising area for future research and opens opportunities
to build robust adversarial defence systems. The method is
also successful in detecting common data corruptions and
perturbations which harm the classifier’s performance. We
illustrate the effectiveness of the method on the CIFAR-10-
C dataset. To facilitate the practical use of the adversarial
detection and correction system we provide an open source
library with our implementation of the method (Van Loov-
Adversarial Detection and Correction by Matching Prediction Distributions
eren et al.).
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A. Models
All the models are trained on a NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080
GPU.
A.1. MNIST
The classification model consists of 2 convolutional layers
with respectively 64 and 32 2 × 2 filters and ReLU acti-
vations. Each convolutional layer is followed by a 2 × 2
max-pooling layer and a dropout with fraction 30%. The
output of the second pooling layer is flattened and fed into a
fully connected layer of size 256 with ReLU activation and
50% dropout. This dense layer is followed by a softmax
output layer over the 10 classes. The model is trained with
an Adam optimizer for 20 epochs with batch size 128 and
learning rate 0.001 on MNIST images scaled to [0, 1] and
reaches a test accuracy of 99.28%.
The autoencoder for MNIST has 3 convolutional layers
in the encoder with respectively 64, 128 and 512 4 × 4
filters with stride 2, ReLU activations and zero padding.
The output of the last convolution layer in the encoder is
flattened and fed into a linear layer which outputs a 10-
dimensional latent vector. The decoder takes this latent
vector, feeds it into a linear layer with ReLU activation and
output size of 1568. This output is reshaped and passed
through 3 transposed convolution layers with 64, 32 and 1
3× 3 filters and zero padding. The first 2 layers have stride
2 while the last layer has a stride of 1. The autoencoder is
trained with the different custom loss terms for 50 epochs
using an Adam optimizer with batch size 128 and learning
rate 0.001.
A.2. Fashion-MNIST
The classification model is very similar to the MNIST clas-
sifier. It consists of 2 blocks of convolutional layers. Each
block has 2 convolutional layers with ReLU activations and
zero padding followed by a 2 × 2 max-pooling layer and
dropout with fraction 30%. The convolutions in the first
and second block have respectively 64 and 32 2× 2 filters.
The output of the second block is flattened and fed into a
fully connected layer of size 256 with ReLU activation and
50% dropout. This dense layer is followed by a softmax
output layer over the 10 classes. The model is trained with
an Adam optimizer for 40 epochs with batch size 128 on
Fashion-MNIST images scaled to [0, 1] and reaches a test
accuracy of 93.62%.
The autoencoder architecture and training procedure is ex-
actly the same as the one used for the MNIST dataset.
A.3. CIFAR-10
We train 2 different classification models on CIFAR-10:
a simple network with test set accuracy of 80.24% and
a ResNet-561 with an accuracy of 93.15%. The simple
classifier has the same architecture as the Fashion-MNIST
1https://github.com/tensorflow/models
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model and is trained for 300 epochs. The ResNet-56 is
trained with an SGD optimizer with momentum 0.9 for 300
epochs with batch size 128. The initial learning rate is 0.01,
which is decreased with a factor of 10 after 91, 136 and
182 epochs. The CIFAR-10 images are standardised on an
image-by-image basis for each model.
The autoencoder for CIFAR-10 has 3 convolutional layers
in the encoder with respectively 32, 64 and 256 4 × 4 fil-
ters with stride 2, ReLU activations, zero padding and L1
regularisation. The output of the last convolution layer in
the encoder is flattened and fed into a linear layer which
outputs a 40-dimensional latent vector. The decoder takes
this latent vector, feeds it into a linear layer with ReLU acti-
vation and output size of 2048. This output is reshaped and
passed through 3 transposed convolution layers with 256,
64 and 3 4 × 4 filters with stride 2, zero padding and L1
regularisation. The autoencoder is trained with the different
custom loss terms for 50 epochs using an Adam optimizer
with batch size 128 and learning rate 0.001.
The adversarial detection mechanism is also tested with an
autoencoder where the 32×32×3 input is flattened, fed into
a dense layer with ReLU activation, L1 regularisation and
output size 512 before being projected by a linear layer on
the 40-dimensional latent space. The decoder consists of one
hidden dense layer with ReLU activation, L1 regularisation
and output size 512 and a linear output layer which projects
the data back to the 32×32×3 feature space after reshaping.
Again, the autoencoder is trained with the different custom
loss terms for 50 epochs using an Adam optimizer with
batch size 128 and learning rate 0.001.
B. Attacks
B.1. Carlini-Wagner (C&W)
On the MNIST dataset, the initial constant c is equal to
100. 7 binary search steps are applied to update c to a more
suitable value. The maximum number of iterations for the
attack for each c is 200 and the learning rate of the Adam
optimizer used during the iterations equals 0.1. Except for
the number of binary search steps which is increased to
9, the hyperparameters for Fashion-MNIST are the same
as for MNIST. For CIFAR-10, the initial constant c is set
at 1 with 9 binary search steps to find the optimal value.
The learning rate and maximum number of iterations are
decreased to respectively 0.01 and 100. Figure 8, Figure 9
and Figure 10 illustrate a number of examples for the C&W
attack on each dataset. The first row shows the original
instance with the correct model prediction and adversarial
score. The second row illustrates the adversarial example
with the adversarial score and incorrect prediction. The last
row shows the reconstruction by the adversarial detector
with the corrected model prediction.
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Figure 8. C&W attack on MNIST. The rows illustrate respectively
the original, adversarial and reconstructed instance with their
model predictions and adversarial scores.
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Figure 9. C&W attack on Fashion-MNIST. The rows illustrate
respectively the original, adversarial and reconstructed instance
with their model predictions and adversarial scores.
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Figure 10. C&W attack on CIFAR-10 using the ResNet-56 model.
The rows illustrate respectively the original, adversarial and re-
constructed instance with their model predictions and adversarial
scores.
B.2. SLIDE
The hyperparameters of the attack remain unchanged for
the different datasets. The percentile q is equal to 80, the
`1-bound  is set at 0.1, the step size γ equals 0.05 and
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the number of steps k equals 10. Figure 11, Figure 12 and
Figure 13 show a number of examples for the SLIDE attack
on each dataset. Similar to C&W, the rows illustrate respec-
tively the original, adversarial and reconstructed instance
with their model predictions and adversarial scores.
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Figure 11. SLIDE attack on MNIST. The rows illustrate respec-
tively the original, adversarial and reconstructed instance with their
model predictions and adversarial scores.
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Figure 12. SLIDE attack on Fashion-MNIST. The rows illustrate
respectively the original, adversarial and reconstructed instance
with their model predictions and adversarial scores.
B.3. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
 values of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 are used for the FGSM attack
on each dataset. The attacks last for 1000 iterations. Fig-
ure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16 show a number of examples
for the FGSM attack on each dataset. Similar to C&W,
the rows illustrate respectively the original, adversarial and
reconstructed instance with their model predictions and ad-
versarial scores.
C. Hidden Layer K-L Divergence
Table 5 and Table 6 show the robustness of the choice of
hidden layer to extract the feature map from before feeding
it into a linear layer and applying the softmax function.
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Figure 13. SLIDE attack on CIFAR-10 using the ResNet-56 model.
The rows illustrate respectively the original, adversarial and re-
constructed instance with their model predictions and adversarial
scores.
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Figure 14. FGSM attack with  0.2 on MNIST. The rows illustrate
respectively the original, adversarial and reconstructed instance
with their model predictions and adversarial scores.
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Figure 15. FGSM attack with  0.1 on Fashion-MNIST. The rows
illustrate respectively the original, adversarial and reconstructed
instance with their model predictions and adversarial scores.
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Figure 16. FGSM attack with  0.1 on CIFAR-10 using the ResNet-
56 model. The rows illustrate respectively the original, adversarial
and reconstructed instance with their model predictions and adver-
sarial scores.
Table 5. CIFAR-10 test set accuracy for a simple CNN classifier
on both the original and adversarial instances with and without the
defence. AEKL is the defence mechanisms trained with the DKL
loss function. AEKL, HL extends the methodology to one of the
hidden layers. HL1, HL2, HL3 and HL4 refer to respectively the
first max-pooling layer, the third convolutional layer, the dropout
layer after the second convolution block and the output of the
flattening layer in the CNN model. HL1 is projected on a 50-
dimensional vector, HL2 and HL3 on 40-dimensional vectors and
HL4 on 10 dimensions.
Attack No Attack No Defence AEKL AEKL, HL1 AEKL, HL2 AEKL, HL3 AEKL, HL4
CW 0.8024 0.0001 0.7551 0.7662 0.7687 0.7655 0.7688
SLIDE 0.8024 0.0208 0.7704 0.7807 0.7835 0.7838 0.7864
Table 6. CIFAR-10 test set accuracy for a ResNet-56 classifier on
both the original and adversarial instances with and without the
defence. AEKL is the defence mechanisms trained with the DKL
loss function. AEKL, HL extends the methodology to one of the
hidden layers. HL1, HL2, HL3 and HL4 refer to respectively
hidden layers 140, 160, 180 and 200 in the ResNet-56 model. HL1
to HL4 are all projected on 20-dimensional vectors.
Attack No Attack No Defence AEKL AEKL, HL1 AEKL, HL2 AEKL, HL3 AEKL, HL4
CW 0.9315 0.0000 0.8048 0.8049 0.8094 0.8152 0.8153
SLIDE 0.9315 0.0000 0.8159 0.8251 0.8277 0.8347 0.8360
